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Abstract
Purpose of Review Allocation of deceased donor kidneys for transplantation has evolved since the first utilitarian approach in
1989. This review looks at how the schemes have evolved over the ensuing three decades.
Recent Findings Four kidney offering schemes have been used in the last 30 years. Successive schemes have evolved from
offering only one donor kidney for a nationally prioritised patient to offering both kidneys, from addressing only kidneys from
donors after brain death (DBD) to offering kidneys from both DBD and circulatory death donors (DCD) and from prioritising
purely on the basis of zero class 2 and minimising class 1 mismatches to a more relaxed approach for older donors and more
difficult to match patients while introducing the concept of longevity matching.
Summary UK kidney offering schemes have evolved through a series of evidence-based analyses to try to optimally address the
principles of utility and fairness in kidney offering.
Keywords Kidney transplantation . Kidney allocation
Introduction
Organ offering schemes in the UK have developed as a com-
promise between utility (optimising the outcomes for a partic-
ular kidney) and justice (fairness). Analyses of prospectively
collected national data have identified donor and recipient
combinations associated with better graft outcomes and
prioritised offering for such combinations. At the same time,
compromises had to be reached between local issues relating
to organ recovery and serving the requirements of those who
were sensitised or had rare tissue types. As the schemes have
evolved, the differing and often conflicting priorities have
been accommodated by utilising points scoring based sys-
tems, where points are used to weigh various donor and recip-
ient characteristics in a potential donor-recipient match, such
that every possible donor and recipient combination is
assigned a score and the two recipients with the highest
donor-recipient scores would be offered an organ. How much
weighting was given to each criterion depended upon the
opinion of a panel of experts, lay members and patient repre-
sentatives, and the results were modelled before implementa-
tion to check that the predicted effects were as intended.
At the same time, there has been a requirement to allow
recipients of other organs who also need a kidney at the same
time to be accommodated, such as those awaiting a combined
kidney and pancreas transplant. Suitable priority for such re-
cipients was necessary to enable the UK national pancreas
offering scheme to work effectively.
During the evolution of the schemes, donor identification
and organ retrieval practices have changed. Renal centres used
to attend all the donors in their regions and remove the kid-
neys, while liver teams would remove the liver. Over time the
liver centres removed more and more donor kidneys while the
regional renal centre did not attend the donor. In 2010 a na-
tional organ retrieval service was established to ensure that
just one abdominal team and one cardiothoracic team attend
each donor. At the same time, responsibility for donor identi-
fication changed from being the responsibility of regional
transplant centres to being a national service. These changes
had the effect of removing the sense of ownership from locally
removed deceased donor kidneys and a greater acceptance of
national sharing.
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In this article, we detail the evolution of UK kidney offer-
ing, from a scheme where one of the pair of kidneys from a
donor was offered largely on utilitarian principles alone to one
where equity of access and fairness combine with utilitarian
priorities.
Beneficial Matching: The 1989 Scheme
In 1987 an analysis was performed of 2282 UK deceased
donor kidneys transplanted between 1979 and 1984, a peri-
od before ciclosporin was widely used [1, 2]. It showed a
graft survival benefit for HLA-A, B, (Class I) and DR (Class
II) 0-0-0 mismatched kidneys, with 1-0-0 and 0-1-0 being
the next best combinations, followed by kidneys with two
Class I or at least one Class II HLA mismatch. Gilks et al.
had also shown the previous year that a pool of 5000 pa-
tients would allow an HLA A, B, DR compatible transplant
in 28% of cases [3]. Following this work, the UK introduced
an allocation scheme in 1989 whereby one kidney from a
pair would be shared nationally, the other kept locally
(Table 1). The shared kidney would be allocated first to a
0-0-0 mismatched recipient, or if there were none, then to
either a 1-0-0 or 0-1-0 mismatched recipient, termed bene-
ficial matches. Preference would be given to children or to a
local recipient for a beneficial match. The other kidney
would be kept locally to minimise ischaemic time and could
be transplanted into the recipient of the centre’s choice. In
addition, sera from the 20% of patients who were sensitised
to over 80% of donors was shared between centres to allow a
cross-match to be performed if a suitable beneficially
matched kidney became available.
At the time beneficial matching was introduced, trans-
plant coordinators were employed by local centres and
were involved in donor and recipient coordination.
Retrieval was undertaken by the nearest transplant centre.
Donor activity was more a product of local efforts and
engagement than national policy. Beneficial matching
made a utilitarian offer of one kidney, while at the same
time not depriving the local centre of both the kidneys that
they had retrieved. Nevertheless the scheme was not well
received by everyone, with criticism that the outcomes of
good donor kidneys were being prejudiced by the increased
ischaemic time incurred in travelling around the country
and that many centres were net losers in the scheme while
others net beneficiaries, such that for a single centre, the
benefits of so-called beneficial matching may be difficult to
realise [4]. In addition there was an argument that the en-
hanced immunosuppression afforded by ciclosporin, when
compared to that offered by the azathioprine/steroid com-
bination that went before, overcame any effect of HLA
mismatching [5], although both assertions were refuted
by others [6, 7].
Favourable Matching: The 1998 Scheme
In 1996 the UK data were reviewed in light of concerns that
factors other than HLA match were important to consider in
any scheme. An analysis of 13,714 kidney transplants per-
formed between 1986 and 1993 was undertaken [8]. This
analysis showed that donor and recipient age, cause of
death, recipient diabetes and HLA mismatches all signifi-
cantly affected outcomes. Longer cold ischaemic times
were also shown to be associated with poorer outcomes,
but whether a kidney was kept locally or not did not affect
outcomes when adjusted for other factors. The resultant
scheme offered both kidneys for any 0-0-0 mismatches na-
tionally, or the first of a pair for favourably matched recip-
ients defined as being 0-1-0, 1-0-0 or 1-1-0 mismatched;
allocation of the remaining kidney was left to the centre’s
own discretion. Those kidneys that were offered were
prioritised for highly sensitised patients over non-
sensitised and children over adults. A points system was
used as a tie break to prioritise the other recipients, taking
into account factors such as recipient age (prioritising youn-
ger adults), the difference in donor and recipient age,
waiting time, sensitisation and the likelihood of receiving
a favourably matched kidney (later termed matchability); it
also included a transplant centre balance of exchange factor
to try to minimise export deficits [9, 10].
The scheme was amended periodically. By prioritising
patients with no HLA-DR mismatches, this and preceding
schemes had inadvertently biased against DR homozygote
patients who would have at least one HLA-DR mismatch
with the majority of donors since the majority are heterozy-
gous at HLA DR. Moreover, any DR homozygote donors
would be compatible with any HLA DR heterozygote bear-
ing the same HLA DR, irrespective of the recipient’s other
DR antigen; hence HLA-DR homozygote recipients would
rarely be allocated a zero mismatch HLA-DR homozygous
donor kidney, and thus they always waited longer for a kid-
ney. In 2000 this bias was redressed by giving additional
prioritisation for patients who were homozygous at the
HLA-DR locus. Further modification in 2002 allowed pa-
tients of blood group B to access favourably matched blood
group O donor kidneys, due to longer waiting times for
blood group B patients compared to patients of other blood
groups.
The scheme achieved many of its objectives. The propor-
tion of HLA 0-0-0 mismatched kidneys rose from 7 to 16%
for adults, and favourable grafts rose from 43 to 52%.
Children achieved matching comparable to that achieved
in adults for the first time in the UK, with 9% 0-0-0 mis-
matched and 55% favourably matched compared to 5% and
30%, respectively, under the previous scheme. More highly
sensitised patients were transplanted (50 per year compared
to 18 in 1997).
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Equitable Sharing of All Kidneys: The 2006 Scheme
Placing emphasis onminimisingHLAmismatches biased against
offering kidneys to recipientswhowere homozygous at anyHLA
locus, particularly HLA-DR, but also was inequitable for patients
of minority ethnic groups whose HLA types were not well rep-
resented in the donor pool [11]. The 2006 scheme arose out of a
desire to improve access to a transplant for people of all ethnicities
and tissue types, to achieve a fairer scheme acceptable to all
patients. The scheme also recognised that the local centres were
no longer retrieving kidneys, and therefore they did not feel the
same degree of ownership of those kidneys, and so it was now
able to offer both kidneys from each donor for national allocation.
The main aims of the scheme were to reduce variation in
waiting times for a transplant while ensuring younger patients
who would require more than one graft in their lifetime were
allocated better matched kidneys, while not being so rigorous
in the matching offered to older patients. In addition, younger
patients were offered more priority beyond previously
afforded paediatric priority when under 18 years of age.
There were two components to the 2006 scheme. The first
was an alteration to how HLA mismatches were defined for the
purposes of the matching scheme: rare HLA antigens, present in
less than 2% of the population, were defaulted to more common
specificities known to be associated with little serological cross
reactivity, thus making it possible for those with rarer HLA types
to be an apparent match (Table 2). The second was an analysis of
the 1998 scheme, identifying areas of inequity and introducing
solutions [10, 12]. To achieve the goals identified above, a
scheme was developed with ‘Tiers’ of priority, and the following
criteria were given a weighting according to their perceived im-
portance, as determined by the professional and patient members
of the group who developed it. Weighting points were awarded
for the following [13]:
& HLAmismatch and age: More points for HLAmatches for
younger patients.
& Waiting time: A point for every day on the waiting list.
& Difference between donor and recipient ages: To mini-
mise difference.
& Location of donors: Dividing the country into 3 zones, with
points if the donor is within the same zone in order to avoid
long distance transfers, and thus minimising ischaemic time.
& HLA-B and -DR homozygous patients, to compensate for
the focus on minimising DR and B mismatches when
HLA matching is prioritised.
Table 1 Sharing schemes in the UK
Scheme Era Number of kidneys shared Prioritisation
Beneficial matching 1989–1998 One Tier 1: 000
(a) Local > national
(b) Highly sensitised over not highly sensitised
(c) Child > adult
Tier 2: 100, 010 recipients
(a), (b) and (c) as above
Tier 3: Non-beneficially matched: Local allocation policy
Favourable matching 1998–2006 One; both if there were
two 000 mismatches
Tier 1: 000
a) Highly sensitised > non-sensitised
b) Children > adults
c) HLA-DR homozygotes > HLA-DR heterozygotes
d) Local > national
Tier 2: 100, 010, 110 recipients
(a) to (d) as above
Tier 3: Non-favourably matched: Local allocation policy
Equitable matching 2006–2019 Two Tier A: 000 mismatched paediatric patients: HSP/HLA-DR homozygote
Tier B: 000 mismatched paediatric: Non HSP/HLA-DR homozygote
Tier C: 000 mismatched adult HSP/HLA DR homozygote
Tier D: 000 mismatched adults (non HSP/homozygote);
HLA-A, B, DR 100, 010, 110 mismatched paediatric
Tier E: All others
Longevity matching 2019 on Two Tier A: The 10% most difficult to match patients and any patients on
waiting list over 7 years
Tier B: Remaining patients, prioritised based on points score:
a) Donor and recipient risk index match
b) Waiting time
c) HLA mismatch/age
d) Local region > non-local region (of 4 national regions)
HSP Highly sensitised patient. Highly sensitised is defined as a calculated reaction frequency of > 85% against a pool of 10,000 donors
HLA Human leucocyte antigen
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& Blood group: Blood group AB patients could receive A
kidneys; well-matched blood group B patients could re-
ceive blood group O kidneys.
These weighting factors were used to prioritise within Tiers
C to E, while waiting time alone was used to prioritise in Tiers
A and B (Table 1).
Patients awaiting multi-organ transplants including a kid-
ney, such as a kidney and pancreas transplant, would be allo-
cated one kidney provided that both kidneys had not first been
allocated to patients in Tiers A and B [14••].
The scheme was successful in reducing the number of
long-waiting patients: After 3 years, the proportion of patients
on the wait list who had been waiting more than 5 years fell
from 17 to 8%. Also, 12% of transplants involved defaulting
of rare antigens, and there were more transplants for ethnic
minority patients (who were over-represented on the trans-
plant list): from 17% of all transplants previously to 20%
under the 2006 scheme. For paediatric patients, the proportion
of less well-matched grafts (i.e. not 000 or favourable
matches) fell from 17% to 9%, reducing chances of sensitisa-
tion that would make future transplants more difficult.
2019 Scheme: Longevity Matching
The 2006 scheme achieved many of its goals but had several
limitations. First, when it was developed, around 10% of kidneys
were from DCD donors, an activity that was focused on a few
centres. These centres invested time to develop local controlled
DCD programmes, did the DCD retrievals themselves, and were
rewarded by being able to allocate both kidneys to local patients
using locally developed algorithms [15]. Following publication
of data showing the good long-term outcomes of DCD kidneys
[16], there was a change in UK practice with increasing
utilisation such that DCD kidneys now comprise 40% of all
deceased donor kidney transplants. This led to an interim scheme
to allocate one of each pair of DCD kidneys to a national patient,




have been many reasons for this, such as the potential recipient
being unfit or other donor issues (e.g. infection risk) making the
kidneyless thanideal,butoften itwasaperception that thepotential
recipient would get a better offer. Indeed, analysis of the 2006
scheme also confirmed that younger patients were more likely to
have an older donor kidney turned down, while offers were less
often turneddown for anolder patient.Moreover, youngerpatients
weremore likely to outlive their graft, while older recipients more
commonlydiedwithafunctioninggraft.Whiledonor-recipientage
matchingwasa factor in thescheme, therewasevidence that some-
thing more effective was required, particularly as donor ages con-
tinued to increase. The analysis also showed that despite
prioritisation for sensitised patients, they were still waiting signifi-
cantly longer than non-sensitised patients and that often this long
wait could be predicted from the time theywere listed.
A new scheme was developed in 2019. Termed an offering
scheme rather than an allocation scheme in recognition of the fact
that the recipient centres and patients had the final say in
accepting the offer, it attempted to address a number of the issues
causing concern in respect of the 2006 scheme. First, both DBD
and DCD kidneys were now included in the offering scheme.
The scheme gives priority to sensitised patients from the outset,
with the aim of bringing their waiting time down to something
akin to that of non-sensitised patients, but at the expense of this,
offers may be immunologically acceptable, but not favourable,
HLA mismatches. It also introduced an element of longevity
matching, to try to match the estimated life of the donor kidney
to the estimated longevity of the recipient, using indices derived
from donor and recipient factors shown to predict the likelihood
of recipient death or graft loss. In addition, it afforded priority for
minimising HLA mismatches in younger patients to improve
outcomes, while reducing the breadth of sensitisation that might
follow a failed graft, in a group of patients likely to need more
than one transplant in their lifetimes. This scheme went live in
September 2019 after a number of simulations to ensure predict-
ed results met the initial objectives of the scheme. Time will tell
whether it does actually achieve its aims.
Conclusions
Kidney offering schemes in the UK have evolved from a
purely utilitarian approach involving only one DBD kidney
Table 2 Defaulted HLA specificities to facilitate matching of rarer
HLA types
Rare specificity Related specificity to
which rare specificity
was defaulted
% of donor pool
of defaulted specificity
A36, A80 A1 18
A43 A10 4
B53 B5 5
B42, B73, B81 B7 15
B59 B8 13




B70, B78 B35 7
B41, B48 B40 7
DR101, DR10 DR1 10
DR9 DR4 20
DR11, DR12 DR5 8
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being allocated on the basis of HLA mismatch minimisation
to a scheme which offers both kidneys, with a focus on HLA
matching and maximising longevity in younger recipients
while relaxing HLA matching for sensitised patients to enable
them to be transplanted sooner. These changes have been
made possible by advances in immunosuppression facilitating
better results in less well-matched grafts and the introduction
of a national organ retrieval service removing local ownership
of donor kidneys. At the same time, periods of ‘local owner-
ship’ have been important first in developing kidney trans-
plantation nationally and latterly in developing one of the
biggest DCD kidney programmes in the world.
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